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<AH>Abstract</AH> 
<AUIP>This article analyses BBC News Online's reporting of the Bolivarian revolution 
in Venezuela, using a sample from a broader selection of 304 articles published on BBC 
News Online between 1998 and 2008. Against the BBC's stated commitment to 
professional values, we find that the BBC's organizational culture is underpinned by a 
liberal nationalist worldview, which limits its interpretive capacities. The analysis notes 
that the liberal nationalism underpinning BBC News Online's reporting limits the 
interpretive capacities of journalists. The ideologically dominant national history of 
Venezuela (the exceptionalism thesis) forms an interpretive framework, which synchs 
with the BBC‘s general conceptualization of the forms and function of a nation state and 
thus prevents adequate understanding of the present. Consequently, the coverage of 
contemporary Venezuelan politics masks the underlying class conflict, instead identifying 
Chavez, who has emerged seemingly from nowhere, as the key agent of political crisis. 
The BBC‘s reliance on a narrative of the disruption of national unity allows it to take 
sides in the conflict whilst apparently remaining neutral.</AUIP> 
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<H1>Introduction</H1> 
<UIP>A number of scholars have pointed to the role of media in establishing and 
maintaining national identity (Morley 2000; Scannell and Cardiff 1991), to the role of 
national interests in framing foreign reporting (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Nossek 
2004) and to appeals to the nation to delegitimize certain political movements as partial 
(Glasgow University Media Group 1976; Kitch 2007; Kumar 2005; Schlesinger 1991). 
These studies show that although it is clear that journalists do have relative autonomy in 
many respects, this autonomy works within a broader interpretive framework, or 
reportorial language, that is shared by the audience. In this sense, nationalism and the 
nation state are common-sense realities that constitute a shared frame of reference 
between most journalists and audiences and institutionalized in news organizations. Here 
we consider a particular form of nationalism, which we refer to as a particularly western 
‗liberal nationalism‘ (see Canovan 1996; Miller 1995; Tamir 1993). This refers to an 
ideology in which nationally based liberal institutions are considered to serve the nation 
as a whole rather than one class and in which (an assumed) national unity should be 
preserved. </UIP> 
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<IP>Here we look at how the BBC News Online‘s reporting of Hugo Chavez and 
the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela between 1998 and 2008 employs a liberal 
nationalist framework that allows BBC journalists to frame the situation without recourse 
to political debate, and allows them to take sides without appearing to do so explicitly. 
Insofar as there are different, competing narratives, we find that they are structured in 
such a way as to give discursive preference to ‗the nation‘, represented by ‗the 
opposition‘, whose class basis is unrecognized. In this sense, the dominant class interests 
of the Venezuelan ‗nation‘ are used to frame the Bolivarian revolution, without, of course, 
stating this class basis explicitly. We find that appeals to national unity, and the emphasis 
on disruption and threat to national unity, seem to override other concerns, structuring the 
overall narrative as one in which an external threat (Chavez) misleads Venezuelans to 
misunderstand their real (national) interests.</IP> 
<IP>In the broader study from which this article is drawn, an analysis of a larger 
collection of 304 articles published on the BBC News Online website between 1998 
(when Chavez was first elected) and 2008 (the beginning of the study) was used to get a 
sense of the overall balance of articles. We gathered the articles by using the BBC‘s own 
search engine, searching for ‗Venezuela‘, and then augmenting this with a Google search: 
‗Venezuela site: news.bbc.co.uk‘. We then manually collated the articles to exclude those 
with only minor mentions, for example, if Venezuela was merely mentioned as being 
present at a meeting. Here we undertake a close textual analysis of a sample of articles 
drawn from the larger study. Here we are interested in how BBC News Online 
communicate their understanding of the social, economic and political divisions that 
frame Venezuelan politics. We were especially interested in the significance of these 
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divisions as explanatory factors in understanding support for and opposition to the 
Bolivarian Government of Venezuela, for example whether there would be any 
recognition of class, how it would be framed, how evident divisions are dealt with and 
what the causes are said to be. The ways in which this division is recognized and dealt 
with can help illustrate ideological tendencies in the BBC‘s news reporting.</IP> 
<H1>Media and nationalism</H1> 
<UIP>Here liberal nationalism is conceptualized as an ideological trope that transcends 
all particular interests. The nation itself stands above particularity yet masks the 
conditions under which it exists, such as class rule, class struggle and the artificiality of 
the traditions, customs and institutions through which it is identified, as well as the 
mythological status of its official history (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). </UIP> 
<IP>Nationalism is partially sustained through media institutions and discourses 
(Anderson 1991; Billig 1995; Smith 1991). As Morley (2000: 107) put it, national 
broadcasting systems create a sense of unity and mass experience in a population. Despite 
the supposed globalization of culture and media, mainstream media remain crucial 
supports for national identity (Price 1995; Schlesinger 1991; Smith 1991), national 
frames of reference remain strong and the perspective of the home state continues to be 
shared by national and international news media (Hallin 1992; Herman and Chomsky 
1994; Nossek 2004; Waisbord 2002).</IP> 
<IP> A number of studies looking specifically at social and political conflicts in 
western liberal democracies have identified nationalist frameworks that operate to 
construct ‗the nation‘ as an entity that is threatened by sections of the population – the 
slum dwellers – who stand outside acceptable norms of bureaucratically constrained 
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political behaviour (Fishman and Marvin 2003; Hall et al. 1978; Hallam and Street 2000; 
Schlesinger 1991: Chapter 5), especially in the realm of industrial conflict (Glasgow 
University Media Group 1976; Kitch 2007; Kumar 2005). Nationalism has been shown to 
have a conservative function in responding to outbreaks of industrial action, whereby 
particular interests operate through universalizing appeals (Kumar 2005). Thus we see the 
conflation of dominant class interests with national interests, which means that those who 
challenge dominant class interests come to be considered as enemies of the national 
interest. It is in this respect that Gluckstein (1999) noted the tendency of the 1930s fascist 
ideology to frame Marxists as enemies of the ‗national community‘, as ‗treacherous 
murderers of the nation‘ and a ‗pestilence‘ with a hold on ‗the nation‘s neck‘, stoking 
class conflict. More recently Pan, Lee, Chan et al. (2001) pointed to the obfuscation of 
political conflict under the narrative of the ‗family-nation‘, based around the interests of 
the capitalist class. It is this invocation of harmony within the national family that enables 
corporate media to take the side of the owners without appearing biased. </IP> 
<H1>The BBC: Class and nation</H1> 
<UIP>The BBC is widely recognized as an important news organization whose 
journalism is based on accuracy, independence and impartiality. Indeed, the government 
‗Agreement‘ on which the BBC‘s existence is based stipulates that the BBC Trust should 
‗seek to ensure that the BBC gives information about, and increases understanding of, the 
world through accurate and impartial news, other information, and analysis of current 
events and ideas‘ (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2006: 3).</UIP> 
<IP>The BBC‘s Editorial Guidelines make this commitment more thoroughly. 
According to the Guidelines, BBC News should ‗strive to be accurate and establish the 
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truth of what has happened‘ and ‗weigh all relevant facts and information to get at the 
truth‘. BBC News should ‗be honest and open about what we don‘t know and avoid 
unfounded speculation‘. BBC News should also ‗strive to be fair and open minded and 
reflect all significant strands of opinion by exploring the range and conflict of views‘. 
Furthermore it commits BBC News to being ‗objective and even handed in our approach 
to a subject. We will provide professional judgments where appropriate, but we will never 
promote a particular view on controversial matters of public policy, or political or 
industrial controversy‘. Finally, it asserts BBC News‘s independence from ‗both state and 
partisan interests‘ (BBC 2005: 7).</IP> 
<IP>Despite this context, the BBC is a site of discourse, marked by these 
institutional arrangements, its ‗news culture‘ (Allan 2004), its interfaces with other 
institutions and broader hegemonic systems of representation. From its inception, one of 
the key roles for the BBC was to engage a national framework for the interpretation of 
events. The BBC was thus an institutional site of discourse through which knowledge of 
the world would be structured. As with any other institution, its processes of recruitment 
and socialization draw staff who share those institutional goals, which then form part of 
the embodied institutional culture.</IP> 
<IP>The BBC has changed significantly over time, as did the deeply entrenched 
dominant class hegemony, yet its news culture retains much of the Reithian culture, 
especially in respect of the dominant conception of the nation (outside hard news, the 
BBC has diversified to embrace a broad conception of the nation, yet it is still marked by 
particularly liberal nationalist values). A number of scholars have noted the central role 
played by BBC News in establishing a broad and flexible national identity within the 
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United Kingdom, anchored in dominant class interests that seem to belie its professional 
commitments (Williams 1974: 33–34; see also Briggs 1986; Scannell and Cardiff 1991). 
Philo (1995) and Creeber (2004) also note the strong consensual orientation that masked 
class control in the early days of the BBC, which carried on in less explicit form 
throughout the twentieth century. </IP> 
<IP>The subtlety of institutionalized discourse, and the more recent pluralization 
of Britishness (which includes the BBC transforming its recruitment processes to draw 
from a broader range of ethnic and class backgrounds), has not meant that the core 
understanding of the nation as a good and necessary entity has disappeared. Class and 
group fractions are still largely overcome in news discourses, the good of the nation is 
prioritized over class struggle (especially during industrial disputes) and dominant 
historical narratives still bind a diverse population around the ‗we‘, and still largely 
revolve around elite history and feed into dominant interpretive frameworks.</IP> 
<IP>The general class bias in elite journalism is shown in the findings of the 
Sutton Trust‘s (2006) research. The proportion of the top 100 journalists who attended 
private schools has risen over the past twenty years, from 49 per cent in 1986 to 54 per 
cent in 2006, and the proportion who had attended either Oxford or Cambridge 
University remains around half. Of the BBC journalists included in the report, more than 
half attended Oxford or Cambridge. The liberal nationalist tendencies of BBC journalists 
can be observed in media outputs of key correspondents such as Cambridge-educated 
Jeremy Paxman‘s (1999) book The English, Cambridge-educated Andrew Marr‘s 
television programmes History of Modern Britain (2007) and Britain from Above (2008) 
and television programmes by Oxford-educated Peter Snow‘s Battlefield Britain (2004) 
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and Oxford-educated David Dimbleby‘s A Picture of Britain (2005) and How We Built 
Britain (2007). As Steve Pope (1999: 57) puts it, ‗White middle-class men dominate the 
national media, and it has to be said that the interests and culture of this group manifest 
themselves not only in the news agenda but also in how these stories are written‘.</IP> 
<IP>The class-based liberal nationalism underpinning BBC reporting is 
sometimes explicitly recognized, as when a government minister commented on the 
BBC‘s reporting on strikes in the 1970s: </IP> 
<EXT>No obligation of impartiality could absolve the broadcasting services from 
exercising their editorial judgement […] within the context of the values and objectives 
of the society they are there to serve. The BBC have as trustees for the public to judge not 
only what is best in news terms, but what is in the national interest. 
<SRC>(cited in Garnham 1978: 19)</SRC></EXT> 
<UIP>More recently, where there has been increasing diversity, it has actually 
been incorporated into a reformulated nationalism (Curran 2002). It is precisely diversity, 
tolerance and pluralism that become (ideologically) constitutive of Britishness. 
Nationalism thus remains a core value of the BBC, and the role of broadcasting in the 
construction and maintenance of the ‗national family‘ remains crucial for domestic news 
(Cardiff and Scannell 1987; Morley 2004), but we show that the notion of a class-blind 
‗national family also pervades reporting of news abroad.</UIP> 
<IP>In this sense, official histories have strong class-based ideological 
underpinnings, as demonstrated by Marxist historians (Thompson 1980; Williams 1961). 
Indeed, the narrowness of official histories drawn upon by the BBC in news and 
documentaries, and their mythical-ideological underpinning, has been criticized in a 
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number of studies (Chapman 2007; Harrison 2007; Philo and Berry 2004; Qing 
2007).</IP> 
<IP>Here we argue that if liberal nationalism is ingrained into the culture of the 
BBC, then the interpretive framework employed by correspondents will ignore or 
downplay the fragmented class basis of a political order, wherein deviations from a 
consensus-oriented, liberal nationalism become incomprehensible. In this sense, the 
Bolivarian revolution would be understood as resulting not from legitimate and 
constructive class conflict, but from wanton destruction aimed at the heart of the national 
family of Venezuela. Indeed, rather than following Pan, Lee, Chan et al. (2001), in 
identifying a situation in which conflict is obscured under the family-nation, we identify a 
situation in Venezuela where the nationalist viewpoint is drawn out through explicit 
reporting of political ‗polarization‘. In this sense, we suggest that appeals to national 
unity, grounded in a particular historical narrative, allow journalists to appear neutral by 
foregrounding the interests of ‗the nation‘ without expressly articulating them beyond the 
maintenance of a mythologized stability and national unity facilitated by liberal 
democratic institutions. This is to say that a particular traditionally established 
nationalism allows a dominant ideology to be expressed indirectly, and against which 
class-based political, social and economic conflicts are to be neutralized as alien and 
unnatural.</IP> 
<IP>Of course, the actual process of newsgathering impacts on the media 
construction of events, and it is clear from discussions with BBC correspondents that 
local stringers and other journalists in Caracas have a significant influence on the 
interpretation of events. Documents released by Wikileaks (2011) and in Golinger‘s 
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(2007) study show clear and sustained collaboration between ‗the opposition‘, 
commercial media and the US government in opposing the Venezuelan government. It is 
within this mileux that BBC correspondents live and work, and with all of the normal 
economic and social constraints on newsgathering, sense can be made of how they 
become aligned with certain discourses on Venezuela.</IP> 
<H1>National history and reportorial frame: The myth of Venezuelan 
exceptionalism and the rise of the Bolivarian movement in Venezuela</H1> 
<UIP>As Philo and Berry (2004, 2006) demonstrate, the selection of a particular 
historical narrative of a situation greatly affects reportorial frames, forming part of the 
thematic framework. The selection may be influenced by dominant sources, accepted 
‗official histories‘ or, as we suspect in the current situation, class experience. In addition 
to ‗presence‘, reporting is influenced by ‗absence‘ – in this instance, the absence of class 
as a determining factor or material experience.</UIP> 
<IP>For example, BBC News Online‘s interpretive framework appears to depend 
on a particular historical narrative that is shared by the Venezuelan elite: a narrative of a 
stable national tradition of democracy that sets Venezuela apart from its neighbours and 
largely ignores the centrality of class conflict in Venezuelan history. At the same time, 
there is an absence of recognition of the class experience of the vast majority of 
Venezuelans.</IP> 
<IP>This clear in its early reporting, BBC News provides the frame for later 
reports. The background provided in ‗Venezuela's democratic record‘ (7 December 1998) 
argues that ‗Venezuela is proud of its democratic record‘ and that ‗many in his own 
country‘ see Chavez as representing ‗a retrograde step to the region's past, where 
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autocratic military leaders wielded personal power for their own ends‘. The BBC 
understands the history of Venezuelan democracy as an exception in the ‗region‘, and that 
its democratic record is a source of national pride for the nation as a whole.</IP> 
<IP>That Chavez stands outside this national tradition of democracy and poses a 
threat to it is identified very early on in the BBC‘s reporting. In 1999 ‗Venezuela‘s 
dictatorship‘ (31 August 1999), written by ‗an assembly member Jorge Olavarria‘, a 
former Chavista, outlined this threat. The BBC reported that in Chavez‘s Venezuela ‗there 
is no such thing as the rule of law. There is a dictatorship through the Constitutional 
Assembly which is completely at the service of President Chavez‘ and allows Olavarria to 
make an unopposed analogy to Hitler. At the outset, Chavez is identified as a demagogue, 
with the Hitler analogy placing him as an outsider, foreign to Venezuela‘s national 
tradition of democracy.</IP> 
<IP>However, researchers have identified the history that the BBC relies on as a 
myth. Whereas the BBC paints a picture of a stable, unified, effective democratic system 
that is disrupted by the arrival of Chavez, historical research paints a different picture. On 
this account Venezuela was far from a unified, stable system before Chavez. Ellner and 
Salas explain that those who refer to the exceptionalism of Venezuela,</IP> 
<EXT>[f]ailed […] to draw the connection between political exclusion and the 
related phenomena of clientelism, on one hand, and the violation of human rights, 
electoral manipulation, and corruption, on the other […] they took the legitimacy 
of the institutional mechanisms that guaranteed stability for granted. The same 
defects of electoral fraud, corruption, and repression that scholars pointed to as 
contributing to the crisis of the 1990s had been apparent in previous decades. 
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<SRC>(Ellner and Salas 2005: 11)</SRC></EXT> 
<UIP>María Garcia-Guadilla (2005: 12) concurs, explaining that the inadequacy 
of the exceptionalism thesis is illuminated by factors stretching into the history of 
Venezuela. She explains that ‗[t]he notions of the exceptionalism of Venezuelan 
democracy and civil society overlooked the socioeconomic and political-ideological 
polarization that had been under way since the 1960s‘ (see also O‘Coker 1999).</UIP> 
<IP>As with the rest of Latin America, Venezuela has been marked by extreme 
poverty set against a narrowly constituted elite of 5–10 per cent of the population 
(Hoffman and Centeno 2003). Although Venezuela has not historically suffered the levels 
of poverty that have afflicted much of the rest of the continent, between 1975 and 1995 
poverty increased dramatically, with the percentage of persons living in poverty rising 
from 33 per cent to 70 per cent during that period. The number of households in poverty 
increased from 15 per cent to 45 per cent between 1975 and 1995. By 2000 wages had 
dropped 40 per cent from their 1980 levels. Wilpert explains that ‗other poverty measures 
[…] are lower, but all of them paint a picture of a large increase in poverty over the past 
25 years‘ (Wilpert 2007: 108). Indeed, by 1997 a total of 67 per cent of Venezuelans 
earned less than $2 a day (Buxton 2004: 113). In contrast, as Sylvia and Danopoulis 
(2003: 65) explain, ‗Weekend shopping trips to Miami were the order of the day for the 
bourgeois classes. The oil riches, however, did not trickle down to the bottom of 
Venezuelan society. A sizeable portion of Venezuela‘s population remained desperately 
poor‘.</IP> 
<IP>In the 1980s and 1990s, spontaneous popular demonstrations, strikes and 
riots erupted in response to these deep-rooted political, social and economic conflicts 
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(Hillman 1994; McCoy 1995; O‘Coker 1999), and against what Hillman (1994) refers to 
as ‗democracy for the privileged‘, or what Sylvia and Danopoulis (2003: 64) call 
‗subidized democracy‘, and its policy outcomes, specifically the acceptance of the 
Washington Consensus (Gott 2005). The recognition of long-standing, deep-rooted 
political, social and economic conflict has been said to shatter the myths regarding 
Venezuela‘s supposedly unique social, economic and political stability (Ellner 1997; 
Ellner and Salas 2005). However, neither the BBC‘s reports nor its contextual reports 
attribute significance to these events. Also the reports from the period studied do not 
mention the Caracazo massacre of, at the very least, 400 (up to 3000) protesters and 
students railing against IMF (International Monetary Fund) austerity measures in 1989 
(Hardy 2007: 29), the same year as blanket coverage was given to the Tiananmen Square 
massacre.</IP> 
<IP>Despite the centrality of class in Venezuela, the BBC explains the election of 
Chavez as something that cannot be easily understood. Indeed, this lack of understanding 
is comprehensible only if we understand Chavez as a decontextualized individual 
demagogue battling against Venezuela‘s proud national tradition of democracy (Sanoja 
2007), that is, only if we ignore the class dynamic behind him. With deeper consideration 
of Venezuelan history, we can see that Chavez is merely the figurehead of a movement 
that responded to political and economic crises.</IP> 
<IP>As Lander (2005) points out, it was the crises that made possible the rise of 
Chavez and the wider Bolivarian movement. Indeed, civil society organizations and 
social movements grew as the oligarchic political parties became increasingly corrupt, 
nepotistic and detached from ordinary people, the democratic basis for the Bolivarian 
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movement (McCoy 1995). Though the early Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement was 
centred on the Venezuelan military, it depended on alliances with other civilian social 
movements, such as Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), as well as on popular support 
(Gott 2005; Sanoja 2007). By the late 1990s, the movement had caught the imagination 
of the masses and was no longer a vanguard movement. </IP> 
<IP>It was the ‗underclass‘ in the barrios that moved to support Chavez, which 
has provided the core support for Chavez and consolidation of the revolution. Whereas 
the organized working class had been integrated in the old political system, the urban 
poor had been continually excluded from all social, political, cultural and economic 
spheres. But as the organized working class had suffered from the neoliberalism imposed 
in the 1990s, so their support for the old system dwindled as support moved to Chavez, 
thus accounting for the consistent support of 55–60 per cent of the population.</IP> 
<IP>Having been unsuccessful in leading Bolivarian coup attempts in 1989 and 
1992, Hugo Chavez was elected as the president of Venezuela for the first time in 1998 
with 56 per cent of the vote. His proposed constitution was passed in 1999 with 72 per 
cent of the vote. Chavez was re-elected in 2000 with 60 per cent of the vote, and although 
the main observer, the Carter Center, found that there were faults with the electoral 
process, including a lack of transparency, it stated that ‗the majority of Venezuelans 
continued to support the radical reform program of President Hugo Chávez through five 
more elections and referenda‘ since 1998 and that ‗the presidential election legitimately 
expressed the will of the people‘ (Neuman and McCoy 2001: 10). In 2004 Chavez won a 
recall vote, called by ‗the opposition‘, which utilized provisions in the Bolivarian 
constitution, with 59 per cent of the vote. The result was confirmed by the Carter Center, 
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though the European Union refused to observe because of what it regarded as 
unreasonable restrictions on its observation. Chavez was most recently re-elected in a 
general election of 2006, which he won with 63 per cent of the vote. The result was 
confirmed by the Organization of American States, the European Union, Mercosor (the 
South American free-trade zone) and again the Carter Center. Chavez lost a referendum 
for a new constitution in 2007 by 51 per cent  to 49 per cent. Thereafter the Bolivarian 
party was, outside Caracas, the biggest party of regional elections in 2008, won a 2009 
constitutional referendum and Chavez's remained the biggest party in Parliament after the 
2010 national elections. To set Chavez‘s democratic support in perspective, victorious 
parties in UK elections since 1979 have achieved between 35.3 per cent and 43.9 per cent 
of the vote.</IP> 
<IP>Despite massive popular support, from the outset the BBC framed Chavez‘s 
election as a possible threat to a rightful order (see below). For example, reporting after 
the 2002 coup, the BBC explains that ‗the impact of Mr Chavez's ―Bolivarian revolution‖ 
on Venezuela's institutional framework will prove harder to reverse‘, which implies that 
Bolivarian institutions are not ‗Venezuelan‘ and that reforms ought to be reversed because 
of their alien nature (‗Venezuela‘s political disarray‘, 12 April 2002). In this case BBC 
News Online‘s interpretive framework not only seems to ignore a class-fractured history 
of political and social conflict but also removes the context through which the rise of the 
Bolivarian movement is comprehensible. By 2007, the BBC‘s Q&A on the referendum 
tries to offer an ‗explanation‘ for Chavez‘s election, asking, ‗Why does President Chavez 
have such a strong political base?‘ (Extract 9 below). The article recognizes Chavez‘s 
assertions about the previous two-party system being ‗oligarchic‘, but gives no context 
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for public dissatisfaction relating to human rights abuses, poverty, political corruption, 
the Caracazo Massacre, IMF austerity measures and so on. Furthermore it presents the 
‗destruction‘ of the two-party system as the result of Chavez‘s will, rather than resulting 
from a democratic mandate confirmed by a constitutional referendum supported by more 
than 70 per cent of the population. </IP> 
<H1>‘The Opposition’ as defenders of the nation</H1> 
<UIP>The shortcomings of the BBC‘s understanding of the past, and its ignorance of 
class, operate not just to delegitimize Chavez but also to legitimize ‗the opposition‘ as the 
true defenders of the once-harmonious Venezuelan nation and its democratic tradition. It 
also serves to signify a unified source of democratic resistance rather than a politically 
fractured class-bound set of groups coalescing around the old political and economic 
elite.</UIP> 
<IP>‗Opposition in Venezuela warning‘ (12 April 1999) reports that ‗Opposition 
leaders in Venezuela have appealed to the international community to intervene to protect 
democratic rule‘. The article ‗Sweeping powers for Venezuelan assembly‘ (13 August 
1999) describes the fears of ‗critics‘ that constitutional reforms would end in ‗pseudo-
democracy‘ and autocracy, leaving the last paragraph to Chavez to retort that he aims to 
create a ‗truly democratic institution‘. In ‗Chavez opponents face tough times‘ (6 
December 2005) the US state department, ‗opposition politicians‘ and ‗experts‘ berate 
Chavez‘s reforms – he is described as acting ‗like a totalitarian autocrat‘; it is claimed 
that he ‗uses parliament as a fig leaf of democracy‘, and closes off ‗democratic spaces in 
the Venezuelan state‘. Although the BBC does report an expert‘s opinion that ‗As the 
conventional understanding of democratic governance diminishes, there is a lot more 
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social democratisation than ever before‘, it sits uneasily in a framework in which 
democracy is understood in terms of its proximity to the United Kingdom‘s Westminster 
model. Furthermore, the BBC‘s own correspondent ends by suggesting that ‗Mr Chavez 
will make an effort to appear more tolerant towards political opposition since a clause in 
the Mercosur agreement binds member states to uphold democracy‘ (emphasis added), 
which seems to indicate that the opposition are the real source of democracy. Whereas the 
national Parliament did lose power under Chavez, it did not necessarily mean that there 
was a reduction of democracy. Rather, the Parliament was seen to have served the 
oligarchy, sustaining the cosy relations fostered by the old two-party system. It was for 
this reason that the Chavez government proposed in the constitution to devolve power 
down to local communities, a proposal that has been an important aspect of participatory 
and direct democratic theory (Pateman 1970) and practice. If the BBC idealizes 
democracy as the limited paradigm of an adversarial two-party system (which Venezuela 
had before Chavez), then it is unsurprising that the elite rhetoric over the reform of the 
political system that served them as undemocratic fits BBC frames.</IP> 
<IP>Whilst the BBC invests legitimacy in ‗the opposition‘, Garcia-Guadilla 
(2005: 117–20) explains that on occasion the ‗social organizations of the opposition and 
the popular sectors have locked themselves into alliances with political parties, however 
discredited and delegitimized‘. On other occasions, those organizations have usurped the 
old parties, and the subsequent power vacuum has led ‗social organizations of the 
opposition to look to the military and has stimulated undemocratic civilian-military 
alliances‘. Ultimately Garcia-Guadilla explains the ‗opposition‘ organizations as corrupt, 
class-interested and often undemocratic in structure and action.</IP> 
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<IP>The key ‗civilian-military alliance‘ was manifested in the coup that took 
place against the elected government on 11 April 2002, which Eva Golinger‘s (2007) 
study shows was backed, at least rheotically, by the US government as part of a broader 
policy of destabilization and overthrow of the government. The coup leaders – made up 
of business leaders, politicians of the old regime and the military – overthrew Chavez for 
a couple of days before a popular uprising of the poor, workers and the broad Bolivarian 
movement returned him to his elected position.</IP> 
<IP>The coup was at no point framed with reference to the tradition of US 
usurpation of democratically elected governments in Latin America and around the world 
(Agee 1975; Brody 1985; Chomsky 1992; Chomsky and Herman 1979a, 1979b; Herman 
and Chomsky 1988). Rather, the mythical role of ‗the opposition‘ in defending the 
national tradition of democracy provided a background for reporting the coup. BBC 
News published nine articles on the coup on 12 April 2002, all of which were based on 
the version of events of the coup leaders, who were, alongside the ‗opposition‘, 
championed as saviours of the nation. </IP> 
<IP>Although BBC News did report the coup, the only time it mentioned the 
word ‗coup‘ was as an allegation of government officials and of Chavez‘s daughter, who, 
alongside ‗Cuba‘, were the only voices opposed to the coup. The BBC‘s explanation was 
that Chavez ‗fell‘, ‗quit‘ or ‗resigned‘ (at best at the behest of the military) after his 
‗mishandling‘ of strikes (which, as Hardy [2007] reminds us, were actually management 
lockouts) and demonstrations in which his supporters had fired on and killed protestors. 
‗Oil prices fall as Chavez quits‘ explains that Chavez quit as a result of a ‗popular 
uprising‘. We are told in ‗Venezuela to hold elections within a year‘ that ‗Mr Chavez, 
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who resigned after a three-day general strike in protest against his policies ended in 
violence‘ (12 April 2002). In reporting this latter, Adam Easton, the BBC‘s correspondent 
in Caracas, wrote, ‗Film footage also caught armed supporters of Mr Chavez firing 
indiscriminately at the marchers‘ (‗Venezuela‘s new dawn‘). The footage in question was 
broadcast by an oligarch‘s channel that had supported the coup and is now known to have 
been manipulated. </IP> 
<IP>In ‗Venezuela‘s political disarray‘ (12 April 2002) the coup was framed as a 
‗restoration‘ of democracy, with the subheading ‗Restoring democracy‘ – again drawing 
on the exceptionalism of pre-Chavez Venezuela. The seizure of power by Pedro Carmona 
was described thus: ‗In forming a transitional government Venezuela has looked not to an 
existing politician but to the head of the business leaders‘ association‘. We see here that 
the small class of the military and business elite that led the coup is Venezuela.</IP> 
<IP> Given that Chavez won two elections and a constitutional referendum prior to the 
coup, it is surprising that the BBC gave discursive privilege to the coup leaders. The 
democratic intentions of the coup leaders were unquestioned. In ‗Venezuelan media: ―It's 
over!‖ ‘ the BBC allowed the editor of El Universal to declare unopposed, ‗We have 
returned once again to democracy!‘ To further demonstrate the indigenous nature of the 
‗unrest‘ against the exogenous threat that is Chavez, all of the vox pops used in the nine 
articles were from ‗opposition‘ supporters. It is therefore reasonable to infer that ordinary 
Venezuelans did not support Chavez, and that whilst the coup was ‗popular‘, the counter 
coup was not.</IP> 
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<H1>Chavez as the agent of polarization</H1> 
<UIP>Despite Chavez‘s democratic mandate, he is constructed by the BBC not just as an 
outsider, but as having been the agent of ‗polarization‘ or ‗division‘ within the 
Venezuelan nation. Below is a selection of passages that illustrate this.</UIP> 
<EXT>Extract 1 
Correspondents say Venezuela has been bitterly polarised by more than five years 
of Mr Chavez. 
<SRC>(‗Venezuela army officers arrested‘, 9 July 2004, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<EXT>Extract 2 
Controversial figure 
Since first coming to power in 1998, Mr Chavez has polarised public opinion in 
Venezuela. 
<SRC>(‗Marathon vote ends in Venezuela‘, 15 August 2004, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<EXT>Extract 3  
Venezuela was polarised by the surprise victory of Mr Chavez – Venezuela‘s first 
president from an indigenous heritage – in presidential elections in 1998. 
<SRC>(‗Chavez claims referendum victory‘, 16 August 2004, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
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 <EXT>Extract 4 
The political divide in Venezuela is enormous and the decision not to renew a 
licence for an opposition-aligned television station is exactly the sort of issue that 
widens that rift.  
<SRC>(‗TV row widens Venezuela's rift‘, 25 May 2007, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<EXT>Extract 5  
The question now is whether the president will try and bridge the deep divide that 
has emerged in Venezuela in the last few years, or whether he will take advantage 
of their [i.e. the opposition‘s] weakness to pursue his own agenda even more 
aggressively. 
<SRC>(‗Analysis: Venezuela at a crossroads‘, 17 August 2004, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<EXT>Extract 6  
‗I invite my countrymen to talk, even to my most bitter enemies I offer my hand,‘ 
said Hugo Chavez, whose populist policies have split Venezuelan opinion. 
<SRC>(‗Chavez tells foes ―accept defeat‖ ‘, 21 August 2004, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<EXT>Extract 7 
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Whoever wins the election will have to try to unite a deeply divided country or 
face much political instability, the BBC‘s Greg Morsbach reports from Caracas. 
<SRC>(‗Polls close in Venezuela election‘, 4 December 2006, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<EXT>Extract 8 
It will take even longer to heal the divisions which have emerged in the last few 
years. That could take a generation. 
<SRC>(‗Crunch time for Venezuelans‘, 14 August 2004, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<UIP>The implication then is that prior to Chavez‘s presidency the country was not 
‗deeply divided‘ (Extract 7) and that social division reflects a subjectively felt anomaly, 
disrupting a usually united nation. At times this is explicit in the reference to ‗Venezuelan 
opinion‘ or ‗public opinion‘ being ‗split‘, and to the country having been ‗bitterly 
polarised‘. In other words, it does not refer to actual material, class ‗division‘ or 
inequality, but to something of recent origin that can be ‗healed‘ (Extract 8), and so unity 
regained without recourse to transformation in the material domain. The subjective 
experience remains, even if felt ‗deeply‘, a superficial division, with the nation remaining 
essentially united.</UIP> 
<IP> BBC News Online‘s adherence to a dominant, class-bound historical narrative 
leaves its journalists purblind to class division, leaving Chavez as the exogenous ‗cause‘ 
of the subjective ‗rift‘ (Extract 4). Rather than the figure of Chavez organically emerging 
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out of the process of ‗polarisation‘, thereby coming to symbolize and lead the mass 
movement, Extract 3 suggests it was merely the single discrete event of his ‗victory‘ in 
the election – as opposed even to the election process which climaxed in the victory – 
which ‗polarised‘ Venezuela. The relevant image here is of the triggering of the divergent 
preferences of two groups of passive consumers in response to an option already chosen 
by an independent process over which they have no control. </IP> 
<IP>But if Chavez is represented as lacking organic roots and if his democratic 
legitimacy is questionable, how is his rise and indeed continuing mass support to be 
explained? One answer is to simply suggest that this rise is a mystery, with the president‘s 
ascendancy being presented as a sort of bolt from the blue. Thus there is reference to his 
‗surprise victory‘ in the 1998 elections (Extract 4), and the 2004 referendum result is 
referred to as ‗an extraordinary turn around, and one that defies easy explanation‘ 
(‗Analysis: Venezuela at the crossroads‘, 17 August 2004). The institutional ignorance of 
working-class experience in Venezuela leaves the journalist lost. Chavez‘s supporters did 
not appear as significant rational actors in the BBC‘s reporting. </IP> 
<IP>However, at times it appears that we are promised a more organic picture of 
Chavez‘s ascendancy. In an article entitled ‗Q&A: Venezuela‘s referendum‘ (30 
November 2007) the final section reads as follows: </IP> 
 
<EXT>Extract 9 
Why does President Chavez have such a strong political base?  
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From 1958 until 1998, Venezuela was dominated by two major parties, the centre-
right Christian Democratic Party (Copei) and the centre-left Democratic Action 
(AD). 
After his victory in the 1998 election, Mr Chavez, who had previously tried to take 
control of the country in a failed military coup in 1992, set out to destroy this two-
party system, which he described as oligarchic. 
President Chavez has been working to set up a socialist republic by reforming the 
political and social systems. 
He has nationalised key industries, such as telecommunications and electricity. He 
has also increased government control of oil and gas sectors. 
He has invested millions of dollars from Venezuela‘s oil revenues into social 
projects. 
Since 2003, he has maintained a strict price regime on some basic foods like coffee, 
beans, sugar and powdered milk. This measure was designed to curb inflation, but it 
has also led to shortages of staple foods. 
Today Venezuelan politics is divided between a pro- and an anti-Chavez camp. His 
supporters say he has given a political voice to millions of poor Venezuelans who 
were disregarded by the ‗traditional‘ political parties. 
His opponents describe him as a populist who is looking to entrench himself in 
power.</EXT> 
 
<UIP>The BBC‘s attempt to contextualize fails to account for any sense of conflict, class 
based or otherwise, that might explain the rise of the Bolivarian movement. Rather, the 
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passage as a whole presents a picture of Chavez as an autonomous agent, and of the 
‗divided‘ political scene as exclusively a product of his reforming will. There is a 
punctual beginning following the unexplained ‗victory in the 1998 election‘. Omitting 
any of the history of struggle from below, we abruptly find ourselves in the situation 
‗[t]oday‘, when ‗Venezuelan politics is divided between a pro- and an anti-Chavez camp‘. 
It again seems that instead of a material basis to the division, in terms of underlying class 
cleavage, the picture is of divergent free-floating preferences, that is, between 
‗supporters‘ and ‗opponents‘. It is not actually said that those who might benefit most 
from the reforms – such as the ‗millions of poor Venezuelans‘ – form his base of 
‗supporters‘. The extent to which such reforms have really benefited one side rather than 
another is qualified in that his ‗strict price regime‘ ‗has also led to shortages of staple 
foods‘. This point will be returned to below. There is rarely a significant recognition of 
the proportion of ‗poor‘, or ‗supporters‘ or ‗opponents‘. Rather there appears to be a 
reasonable 50/50 division between those who ‗support‘ without showing explicitly that 
they might be active agents who benefit from the revolution, as opposed to his 
‗opponents‘ who may have as strong anti-democratic class interest. The visual imagery 
used often feeds into this narrative. ‗Crunch times for Venezuelans‘ (14 August 2004) 
presents two photographs to represent ‗supporters‘ and ‗opponents‘. The former are 
represented by five children queuing at a doorway with the caption ‗Chavez has spent 
millions on social measures such as soup kitchens‘, from which it is not unreasonable to 
suggest a reading, given the context, that few actually benefit, that they are young and 
impressionable and that perhaps ‗millions‘ is too much for soup, as well as the historical 
significance of ‗soup kitchens‘. The ‗opposition‘ is represented by an aerial photograph of 
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thousands (seemingly hundreds of thousands) of people marching through Caracas with 
the caption ‗The opposition has been trying to get rid of Chavez for years‘. </UIP> 
<H1>Division, non-nation and rational unity</H1> 
<UIP>Associated with the focus on symptoms is the message running through the 
reporting of the (non-class) divide itself as existing for no good reason outside Chavez‘s 
desire, as if division for the sake of division, and so purely destructive. The liberal 
nationalist viewpoint cannot understand why members of a nation who are bound by their 
sense of collective identity could be involved in conflict. Without consideration of class 
fracture, the situation remains incomprehensible.</UIP> 
<IP>At times (Extract 8), divisions are metaphorically represented as an illness 
within the national body (cf. Perry 1983). The force of the recurrent foregrounding of 
emotional ‗polarisation‘ and ‗division‘ is to suggest the opposite to a dynamic socially 
transformative conflict: they mark a national paralysis. As one article puts it, ‗Venezuela 
[…] has been mired in political conflict and an economic tailspin since President Chavez 
was briefly deposed in April‘s coup‘ (‗Talks begin in troubled Venezuela‘, 8 November 
2002, emphasis added). To elaborate on this we can note the operation of the ‗apophatic 
method‘ (Medvedev and Bakhtin 1978), which refers to the characterization of 
something – in this case ‗polarisation‘ – negatively in terms of what it is not; that is, by 
means of ‗bare negation‘ and of dissimilarity to something else. Thus, rather than having 
any independent positive historical content to it, ‗polarisation‘ represents simply negation 
of national unity. ‗Venezuela‘s rift‘ represents nothing other than the ‗non-nation‘.</IP> 
<IP> ‗Polarisation‘, as non-nation, simultaneously includes nation. The ‗deeper‘ the 
‗polarization‘, the more underlying national unity can be affirmed as an a priori and 
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inherent reality. Things are thus turned on their head. Division, conceived as subjective, is 
presented as externally imposed on the naturalized nation, rather than nation itself 
resembling an imposed mystical veil that shrouds class conflict. So rather than real 
independent class conflict involving the exposure of national unity as bourgeois 
mystification which works to veil an inherent conflict of interests, what seems to be anti-
nation, destroying unity, here in fact ends up at the same time affirming national 
unity.</IP> 
<IP> This same contradictory pattern at times manifests in a more concrete fashion in 
the reports. The portrayal of Chavez as autonomous and floating above the class divide 
includes the suggestion that despite having ‗supporters‘ who are occasionally recognized 
as coming from impoverished backgrounds, the threat he poses extends to the entire 
population, regardless of class. This in turn involves the reports adopting a transcendent 
universal standpoint in the interests of the nation as a whole conceived as a class-neutral 
category. Chavez divides in a way which brings people together, as a result of the 
consequent shared hardship, which indicates the basic irrationality of political struggle as 
something which only devastates. As a result, it is ‗othered‘ as un-Venezuelan (cf. Kumar 
2005). Consider, for example, one of the few occasions where ‗division‘ or ‗polarisation‘ 
is associated with objective inequalities.</IP> 
 
<EXT>Extract 10 
‘Power to the poor’ 
Caracas is perhaps the physical manifestation of the divisions that wrack this oil-rich 
nation of 26 million people.  
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The middle and upper classes tend to live in the flat, lower-lying areas – many of 
which look as if they have seen better days. The poor live in the barrios they have had 
to build for themselves on the surrounding slopes.  
But while they live apart, both the poor and the middle classes, Chavistas and anti-
Chavistas, complain about high levels of crime and a serious housing shortage. 
<SRC>(‗Venezuela: A nation divided‘, 27 November 2006, emphasis 
added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<UIP>In the third paragraph of Extract 10 it is suggested that class differences do not 
translate into divergent concerns, but rather these concerns are shared by all. There is 
both a class-based explanation for Chavez‘s support, with the ‗poor‘ more likely to be 
‗Chavistas‘, and its denial through a suggested disjuncture between class position and 
experience of hardship. The ‗division‘ is affirmed in the description of respective 
neighbourhoods and undermined in that problems span the divide. Furthermore, 
according to the second paragraph, it is also areas where middle and upper classes live 
that ‗have seen better days‘. People come together in a shared experience which 
transcends class division. </UIP> 
<IP> The same contradictory theme is expressed in a section of an article which has 
been describing the tense lead-up to the referendum of April 2004.</IP> 
<EXT> 
Extract 12  
[…].the atmosphere is already turning ugly. 
Decline and disorder 
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It is certainly not what the international community was hoping for when all sides 
signed up to the referendum process as far back as May last year. 
That was after nearly two years of violent political turmoil. 
First a coup that almost toppled President Chavez. And then a two-month-long 
national strike organised by the opposition. The government survived but the 
economy was brought to its knees. 
These upheavals have left Venezuelans deeply divided. When Hugo Chavez was 
elected in a landslide five years ago, he offered a vision of a more just society that 
would bring people together.  
Somewhere along the line, that dream turned sour. 
President Chavez blames a wealthy, self-interested elite who refuse to give up any 
of their considerable political and economic clout. 
His opponents believe it is the president who has accumulated too much power. 
They say he is a communist dictator in the mould of the Cuban leader Fidel Castro. 
What is clear is that everyone is worse off than they were a few years ago.  
<SRC>(22 February 2004, emphasis added)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<UIP>Rather than having brought ‗all sides‘ ‗together‘ in a positive sense of 
reconciliation, there have been ‗upheavals‘ which have ‗left Venezuelans divided‘, such 
that a negative bringing together has taken place through ‗the economy‘ being 
undermined and ‗everyone‘ being ‗worse off‘. The message could be said to carry the 
following moral: if through a reforming will one interferes with natural national unity, 
unintended consequences in the form of hardship for all may arise, and thus the reality of 
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natural unity will reassert itself. Hence Chavez is at the same time both destroyer and, 
inadvertently, saviour of the nation. The notion that the reforms to the constitution were 
volunteered by the citizens, that participatory democracy might empower a traditionally 
excluded class, is largely absent.</UIP> 
<H1>Familial behaviour and the nation</H1> 
<UIP>If inherent national unity represents a priori reality and a rational order, and yet 
there is mass popular departure from this reality through ‗polarization‘, then we have a 
picture of a nation at odds with itself. This notion is worth considering in more detail 
through looking at a longer article, ‗Crunch times for Venezuelans‘ (14 August 
2004).</UIP> 
<IP> To take the two final sections (entitled respectively, ‗Years of Conflict‘ and 
‗Divisive‘), the nation-as-family metaphor (Kumar 2005; Lakoff 1995; Pan, Lee, Chan et 
al. 2001) works to emphasize the fundamentally foreign and destructive status of the 
divisions, opposed to the ‗shared‘ interests of the national family. ‗Years of Conflict‘ tells 
the story of how one person‘s support for Chavez led him to neglect his friend (Sandra 
Sierra) who was ‗confronted‘ by Chavez supporters. ‗Divisive‘ tells of how ‗politics‘, and 
especially Chavez, has caused the break-up of families.</IP> 
<IP>To the extent that individuals who make up a family or friendship relation 
are likely to share a similar social position in society, this can again help rule out any 
potential material basis to the fracture – thus helping to connote the strange, out-of-the-
blue and irrational manifestation of division. The notion of the conflict appearing as if out 
of nowhere is well expressed in the suggestion of ‗physical violence‘ ‗erupting‘ 
spontaneously, unexpectedly, certainly not as a natural consequence of deep material 
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inequality. In this sense it is redolent of the account of the unexpected ascendancy of 
Chavez.</IP> 
<IP> It is useful to compare this pattern to Burke‘s discussion of the ‗non-economic 
―cause‖ ‘ of national disturbances, and the ideological refusal </IP> 
 
<EXT>[…] to consider internal political conflict on the basis of conflicting 
interests. […] People so dislike the idea of internal division that, where there is a 
real internal division, their dislike can easily be turned against the man or group 
who would so much as name it, let alone proposing to act upon it. Their natural and 
justified resentment against internal division itself, is turned against the 
diagnostician who states it as a fact. This diagnostician, it is felt, is the cause of the 
disunity he named.  
<SRC>([1939] 1984: 70–71)</SRC></EXT> 
 
<UIP>A particular version of crowd psychology is in play in the BBC reports here. 
Chavez, it seems, is responsible for fostering a generalized delusion which is manifested 
in the form of irrational and unnatural acts, motivated by a kind of madness. People, it is 
implied, could not by themselves act as they do. The statement, ‗We did not perceive of 
our society as being so divided that you couldn‘t talk to or understand those on the other 
side of the political spectrum‘ by a source in the article suggests a realization of the alien 
state of mind which this communication gulf represents. The ‗we‘ operates here as an 
exclusionary metonym for the nation – certainly ‗we‘ does not include the poor and 
ignores the history of human rights abuses outlined above. It seems people would not be 
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in this state if it were not for Chavez. We can apply the same points to the first four lines 
of the article, where it is ‗extreme emotions‘ which are ‗tearing‘ the ‗country apart‘. Such 
‗emotions‘ reflect the destructive influence of Chavez, rather than self-determining 
political actors.</UIP> 
<IP> Interestingly, the claim made by Sandra Sierra in the ‗Years of Conflict‘ section 
that ‗[i]t was like he‘d completely forgotten we were best friends‘ suggests not that the 
state of being ‗best friends‘ was now destroyed and non-existent, but rather he (in his 
alien mindset) had ‗forgotten‘ its ongoing existence. Similarly, one might say, it is as if 
Venezuelans had been made to ‗forget‘ that they are part of the same national family. At 
the same time that Chavez may be trying to make people forget their essence, the essence 
is so strong that Chavez cannot eradicate it entirely. Indeed because of the resilience of 
the nation, his attempts to unsettle relations remind Venezuelans of their real, shared 
national interests. The ‗turmoil‘ has taken its toll on things – whether ‗the economy‘ or 
personal ‗relationships‘ – which are shared, with its negative effects transcending class. 
Thus the title of the article, ‗Crunch time for Venezuelans‘, suggests that all have the 
same interests in ending ‗turmoil‘. Indeed, the choice of imagery is telling in this regard. 
Besides the main photograph of Chavez, two images are used, seemingly to strike 
‗balance‘. One is an image of five young children queuing against a wall with the caption 
‗Chavez has spent millions on social measures such as soup kitchens‘, which not only 
seems to refer to inefficiency but also conjures up images of soup kitchens which, in the 
popular imagination, one associates with the 1930s depression. It is also telling that soup 
kitchens are chosen over mass literacy, education or healthcare missions. The other 
photograph is of tens if not hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating against the 
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government, with the caption ‗The opposition has been trying to get rid of Chavez for 
years‘.</IP> 
<IP>Without this realization we have a portrait of collective self-alienation due to 
mass amnesia. The image of self-alienation is represented in the suggestion of in-fighting 
between formally equivalent national citizens (Chavez‘s ‗fiery rhetoric has set 
Venezuelan against Venezuelan‘). This account brings to mind Anderson‘s (1991) 
discussion of how nationalist consciousness is able to retrospectively construct past 
conflicts between combatants sharing no common national bonds in the ‗reassuring‘ 
terms of fratricide. The invention of the ‗American Civil War‘ by its victors is one of the 
examples offered. In this eternalizing discourse, regardless of what happens, the 
antagonists will always be brothers, just as in the imaginative horizon of the BBC reports 
they will always be Venezuelans. The significance of the reports, however, is their 
suggestion of the exogenous nature of the violence between Venezuelan brothers. </IP> 
<IP>Any possibility of understanding the situation as a rational, collective 
political response to historical conditions is obliterated by the clear identification of the 
Bolivarian movement as an unruly mob reacting to, and led by, the ‗totalitarian autocrat‘. 
The ‗mob‘ constitutes the threat to the basic values of the nation, yet in the BBC reports it 
is both pro- and anti-Chavez collectives that manifest the primitive crowd psychology 
under the disorientating influence of Chavez. Again, neither ‗side‘ can be judged by the 
content of their politics as they do not really know what they are doing. This contrasts 
with people demonstrating ‗remembered‘ rational national consciousness, and who are 
certainly not ‗moved by base emotions‘. In fact the only element of the article that lends 
itself to judgement of the ‗sides‘ is the photographical element. The sides are represented 
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in two of the images anchored in the text. In one image there are five poor-looking young 
people queuing for a soup kitchen (itself flagged in the caption as a ‗social programme‘ 
upon which Chavez has ‗spent millions‘, which can only demonstrate the desperate 
conditions into which Chavez has led Venezuela), and the other image is a scene of many 
thousands of people – perhaps hundreds of thousands – marching in the streets. Though 
there is no direct indication of who the people are or what they are marching against, the 
caption explains, ‗The opposition has been trying to get rid of Chavez for years‘. </IP> 
<H1>Conclusion</H1> 
<UIP>BBC News Online‘s reporting on Venezuela has clear flaws in terms of its own 
editorial guidelines. It is clear that the BBC‘s interpretation of the situation is 
underpinned by a particular – and discredited – national history, the exceptionalism 
thesis. This selective use of history – reminiscent of the BBC journalists‘ documentaries 
about Britain mentioned earlier on – cannot provide the organization with the conceptual 
framework with which to understand the present.</UIP> 
<IP> Furthermore, the BBC‘s more general liberal nationalist worldview prevents 
comprehension of the fundamental basis of the conflicts perceived by its journalists. As 
the focus on national well-being masks the fundamental class divisions that have 
animated Venezuelan politics and social life for many decades, those class divisions 
cannot themselves become part of the explanatory framework.</IP> 
<IP> Whilst the commitments shown in the BBC‘s Editorial Guidelines are laudable, 
they seem not to have been achieved in this instance. ‗The truth of what has happened‘ is 
not comprehensible in the here-and-now. Truth, like facts, has history. Certainly it 
appears that the BBC‘s reports have not been committed to reflecting ‗all significant 
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strands of opinion by exploring the range and conflict of views‘. And perhaps the most 
significant problem is that its attempt to be ‗even handed‘ masks the inequitable basis of 
the situation itself.</IP> 
<IP> We are left trying to understand why, in a practical sense, such bias has been 
observed in BBC News Online‘s coverage of Venezuela. Whilst the role of a liberal 
nationalist ideology does seem to explain the emphases in the coverage, the notion of 
relative autonomy and the journalist-as-agent leaves us with something of a gap in the 
study. The next stage will investigate the practical activity of BBC journalists and editors 
covering Venezuela. </IP> 
<IP>Hardy suggests that in respect of Venezuela, news audiences tend to be given 
‗the perspective of an international correspondent […] who works in a downtown office 
building of an opposition newspaper and lives in an apartment in a wealthy 
neighborhood‘ (Hardy 2007: 5). Indeed, the BBC‘s accommodation for their 
correspondents is in the exclusive Alta Mira area of Caracas. This arrangement is 
unsurprising given the crime rate in Caracas. Crucially, this arrangement means the lived 
experience and social networks (and thereby trusted sources of information) of 
correspondents tend to be within middle-class communities. It is also worth noting the 
role of stringers working in Caracas, who were instrumental in painting a particular 
picture of the 2002 coup given access problems and resource limitations at the BBC 
(personal correspondence with Caracas correspondents); they are also largely drawn from 
the private media organizations in Venezuela. ‗Venezuela: A nation divided‘ gives an 
indication of how this restricted pool can colour reporting. In the article, Caracas stands 
in for the whole of Venezuela; moreover, the divisions are expressed in vox pops taken in 
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Alta Mira, Las Mercades and Chacao, which are the three most exclusive neighbourhoods 
in Caracas and can be traversed on foot in less than an hour.</IP> 
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